Consciousness research may be chasing an ill-defined concept

At a major consciousness conference, researchers debate when and where consciousness emerges, from babies to AI. However, the term 'consciousness' lacks a consistent definition across disciplines. Some argue that the concept itself may not be a valid scientific category.
The annual meeting in Santiago drew roughly 500 researchers to debate when consciousness emerges in human development, which animals possess it, and whether AI systems could qualify. A central topic was the feasibility of building a "consciousness detector" to identify members of the consciousness club. Yet the field remains fragmented because "consciousness" is used to mean sentience, awareness, experience, or qualia depending on the discipline, leaving unclear whether researchers share a common subject matter.
The article notes that the modern notion of "phenomenal consciousness"—the feeling of something it is like to be in a state—was introduced by philosopher Ned Block in the 1990s. However, philosopher Kathleen Wilkes' 1988 paper demonstrated that ancient Greek, Mandarin, Croatian, and pre-17th-century English lacked equivalent terms. This historical and linguistic gap suggests the concept may be a recent cultural construct rather than a universal scientific category, challenging its validity as a foundation for research.
If "consciousness" lacks a stable definition, debates about AI sentience, animal welfare, and infant moral status could rest on uncertain foundations. This may affect ethical guidelines and public trust in neuroscience, as claims about conscious machines or beings could be seen as premature. Conversely, it could push researchers toward more precise, operational criteria, potentially sharpening future investigations. Society's legal and moral frameworks might need to adapt, but only if the field can agree on what it is actually measuring.