A two-decade look at constitutional shifts in legislative and executive authority
This essay, the last in a series, traces how constitutional doctrine on legislative and executive authority changed over roughly twenty years. It notes that early federalism limits on Congress gave way to broader legislative power, while presidential authority has grown as congressional oversight has weakened; the newest casebook edition adds recent enumerated-powers decisions, including Landor.
The essay reviews five editions of a constitutional-law casebook, from 2008 to a December release. It recalls that early Rehnquist-era limits on Congress, seen in Lopez and Morrison, were checked by Raich’s approval of federal regulation of locally grown marijuana. NFIB later rejected the ACA mandate under commerce and necessary-and-proper powers while allowing its penalty as a tax.
The newest edition adds Landor, on spending power, necessary-and-proper authority, and damages suits against nonconsenting state officials, plus a Thomas concurrence in Hemani urging a tighter commerce link. It also notes that post-9/11 detention cases, including Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene, have lost salience for the Court.
The essay’s account may shape how lawyers, students, and policymakers understand the balance between Congress and the presidency. Broader presidential authority and weaker oversight could affect people subject to federal enforcement, while revived enumerated-powers questions may influence states, agencies, and litigants. Because the piece is a casebook retrospective, its practical effect may be indirect, mainly informing legal education and debate rather than changing doctrine itself.